MD-4: Long Range Attacks
- Description: Provide models for the game theory of long-range attacks in MCR.
- Authors: Liam Monninger
Overview
Long-range attacks are an inherent vulnerability to PoS networks and a subject of prescient research. We request that the relevance of these attacks to MCR be formally modeled and considered.
Introduction
This reference categorises Long-Range Attacks into
- Simple Attack: The attacker forges an alternative blockchain branch from the genesis block, bypassing timestamp checks to produce blocks ahead of time and overtake the main chain.
- Posterior Corruption: A retired validator is bribed or hacked to sign blocks on an alternate chain, allowing the attacker to increase their block production and potentially surpass the main chain.
- Stake Bleeding: The attacker stalls the main chain by skipping block production while accumulating stake and rewards on a hidden branch, eventually overtaking the main chain.
Desiderata
D1: Evaluate the Opportunity for “Simple” Long-range Attacks and Detection Thereof
User Journey: A researcher or protocol implementer can understand how a simple long-range attack could be executed and detected in MCR.
Justification: Long-range attacks are a known vulnerability to PoS networks. Providing a model which demonstrates how a simple long-range attack could be executed and detected in MCR could enable us to derive preventative measures.
D2: Evaluate the Opportunity for Posterior Corruption Long-range Attacks and Detection Thereof
User Journey: A researcher or protocol implementer can understand how a posterior corruption long-range attack could be executed and detected in MCR.
Justification: Posterior corruption long-range attacks are a known vulnerability to PoS networks. Providing a model which demonstrates how a posterior corruption long-range attack could be executed and detected in MCR could enable us to derive preventative measures.
D3: Evaluate the Opportunity for Stake-bleeding Long-range Attacks and Detection Thereof
User Journey: A researcher or protocol implementer can understand how a stake-bleeding long-range attack could be executed and detected in MCR.
Justification: Stake-bleeding long-range attacks are a known vulnerability to PoS networks. Providing a model which demonstrates how a stake-bleeding long-range attack could be executed and detected in MCR could enable us to derive preventative measures.